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  Abstract 
The new generation of Wireless Sensor Networks, that is known as the 
Internet of Things enables the direct connection of physical objects to the 
Internet using microcontrollers. In most cases these microcontrollers have 
very limited computational resources. The global connectivity provides great 
opportunities for data collection and analysis as well as for interaction of 
objects that cannot be connected to the same local area network. Many of 
application scenarios have high requirements to security and privacy of 
transmitted data. At the same time security solutions that are utilized for 
general purpose computers are not always applicable for constrained devices. 
That leaves a room for new solutions that takes into account the technological 
aspects of the Internet of Things. 
 
In this thesis we investigate the access control solution for the IETF standard 
draft Constrained Application Protocol, using the Datagram Transport Layer 
Security protocol for transport security. We use the centralized approach to 
save access control information in the framework. Since the public key 
cryptography operations might be computationally too expensive for 
constrained devices we build our solution based on symmetric cryptography. 
Evaluation results show that the access control framework increases 
computational effort of the handshake by 6.0%, increases the code footprint of 
the Datagram Transport Layer Security implementation by 7.9% and has no 
effect on the overall handshake time. Our novel protocol is not vulnerable to 
Denial of Service or Drain Battery Attack. 	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1 Introduction 
 
The term The Internet of Things (IoT) is commonly used to name a set of 
objects (or things) that are directly connected to the Internet using the 
Internet Protocol (IP) stack. That is the main difference of wireless sensor 
networks (WSN) of previous generation where nodes were organized in a local 
network with special protocols like ZigBee [34] or WirelessHART [35]. 
Connection of objects to the global network in the IoT opens the opportunity 
for global data analysis. Typical applications for the IoT are home automation 
(e.g. smart home), personal health monitoring (e.g. measurements of heart 
rate, pulse or temperature), building automation (e.g. control heating, 
electrical and ventilation systems of the building), industrial automation (e.g. 
control of the electrical grids) and smart cities. 
 
An example of the resource-constrained microcontroller is shown in Figure 1. 
This is CM5000 that is based on an open source TelosB mote platform [7]. 
The hardware is based on the low power 16 bit microcontroller from MSP430 
family. This microcontroller has only 48KB of program memory and 10 KB of 
data Random Access Memory (RAM). It uses IEEE 802.15.4 2.4GHz wireless 
module. This node is powered with 2 AA batteries (3V in total). In general case 
these nodes are supposed to work for few years without battery replacement. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. TelosB mote CM5000 [7]. 
 
Use cases mentioned above define specific network activity of devices in the 
IoT. These devices usually exchange with small packages so high network 
bandwidth is not as important as for multimedia applications. Moreover 
multicast transmission is more important for machine-to-machine 
communication than reliable transport. 
 
Objects in the IoT (the same as in WSN) are controlled via microcontrollers 
that are constrained in computational power, memory space and, often, in 
power consumption. At the same time protocols that are used by general 
purpose computers like Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and HyperText 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) are too resource consuming to be used on highly 
constrained devices. Moreover, IEEE 802.15.4 radio protocol that is widely 
used in WSN has a limited Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) that does not 
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meet the MTU required by IP protocol version 6 (IPv6). These limitations lead 
developers to use a special protocol stack for the IoT. 
 
The specific protocol stack, limited bandwidth of WSN, constrained resources 
of devices that control objects, and specific use cases in the IoT define specific 
requirements for security solutions. From one side these solutions should be 
as reliable and secure as ones for other internet applications but at the same 
time have less computational complexity, have smaller packages to avoid 
fragmentation, and less communication overhead. Furthermore, these 
security protocols and algorithms should be able to run over the unreliable 
transport and support multicast communications. 
 
The specific protocol stack, general usage scenarios as well as constrained 
resources of the nodes require different security solutions. For example on the 
transport level the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol 
(extension of Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol over unreliable 
transport) can be used [4]. DTLS as well as TLS is a standard solution for 
authentication, key exchange, and secure communication. However, the DTLS 
protocol does not take into account the limited computational resources of 
WSN nodes. Moreover, it doesn’t suggest any solution for authorization 
problems. The possible solution for authorization and access control is the 
main focus of this thesis. 
 
1.1 Contributions 
 
This work suggests the lightweight, fast and secures access control protocol 
that can be used on constrained devices in the IoT. Contributions of the thesis 
are : 
• The design and evaluation of the access control framework for 
constrained devices that is built on top of the industrial security 
protocols, 
• Recommendations for possible use cases of the designed access control 
protocol.  
 
1.2 Outline 
 
This thesis is structured in following order. Chapter 2 gives an overview of 
existing network protocols stack in the IoT and security protocol that can be 
used on the transport layer. Chapter 3 describes in detail the problem that we 
are trying solve and the goal that we are trying to achieve. Chapter 4 covers 
the state-of-art solutions for access control protocols in the IoT. In Chapter 5 
we formulate our solution for the problem and cover implementation details 
in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 contains evaluation results, analysis and 
improvements for our solution. In Chapter 8 we conclude the thesis and give 
consideration of future work. 
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2 Theoretical backgrounds 
 
Protocol stack that is used in IoT is different from one that is used in the most 
of internet applications. The difference of protocols for each layer are shown 
in the Table 2.1 
 
Table 2.1 
Layer IoT General 
applications 
Application layer CoAP, CoAPs HTTP, HTTPs 
Transport Security layer DTLS TLS 
Transport layer UDP TCP 
Network layer IPv6 IPv6, IPv4 
6LoWPAN 
Link layer IEEE 802.15.4 IEEE 802.3, 802.11 
 
2.1 IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Network 
(6LoWPAN) 
 
The IEEE 802.15.4 radio protocol that is widely used in WSN on the link layer, 
has 127 bytes MTU [1]. At the same time IPv6 standard requires MTU to be at 
least 1280 octets [2]. In spite of the fact that applications that utilize IEEE 
802.15.4 link layer in most cases have a very limited payload size, there still 
can be cases when the IP packet cannot be transmitted without fragmentation. 
To overcome this issue 6LoWPAN defines the new layer above the IEEE 
802.15.4 link layer and below IP layer. In order to achieve maximum 
performance the 6LoWPAN standard defines two important concepts [2]. 
• Header compression that defines the way to compress IP and UDP 
headers to minimize the payload. 
• Fragmentation that defines an algorithm to fragment and assemble IP 
packets that are larger than IEEE 802.15.4 MTU. 
 
2.2 User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
 
In internet applications that utilize the request-response pattern it is common 
to use the TCP protocol on the transport level. This protocol has significant 
benefits as it guarantees delivery of packages as well as order of delivery. At 
the same time it requires a communication overhead for connection, 
additional resources to maintain the connection state and package delivery 
confirmation, which may cause timeouts due to the IEEE 802.15.4 network 
latencies. Properties mentioned above are significant shortcomings for the 
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application of TCP in the IoT. Moreover, many applications in the IoT do not 
benefit from guaranteed package delivery. As a result, UDP has become the 
preferred transport layer solution for the IoT. If order and guaranteed delivery 
is required it becomes a part of application level protocol such as CoAP. 
 
2.3 Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 
 
The main idea of the DTLS protocol is to use Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
over an unreliable datagram transport layer. DTLS features the same 4 sub 
protocols as TLS [4]. 
 
• The Handshake protocol defines authentication, key exchange, and 
setting up the reliable connection. 
• The Record protocol defines secured communication. 
• The Alert protocol defines error notification. 
• The ChangeCipherSpec protocol contains only one message which is 
logically a part of handshake process but separated into a different 
protocol. 
 
At the same time DTLS is different because of unreliable datagram transport. 
The potential message loss is also a reason to maintain its own retransmission 
timer. Possible message reordering forces DTLS to maintain a sequence 
number for messages and explicitly include this number in the header. In 
order to reduce the Round Trip Time (RTT) messages can be grouped into 
flights.  
 
The successful DTLS handshake for symmetric keys is shown in the table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2. DTLS handshake. 
Flight Client Server 
1 ClientHello  
2  HelloVerifyRequest 
3 ClientHello  
4  ServerHello 
ServerKeyExchange* 
ServerHelloDone 
5 ClientKeyExchange 
ChangeCipherSpec 
Finished 
 
6  ChangeCipherSpec 
Finished 
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The client starts the handshake by sending a ClientHello message (Flight 1). 
As DTLS operates over the connectionless UDP protocol it has a protection 
against Denial of Service (DoS) attack. DTLS generates the cookie that is an 
HMAC of a randomly generated secret, client IP address, and ClientHello 
parameters and sends it to the client in HelloVerifyRequest (Flight 2). Client 
in return repeats the same ClientHello message with cookie included (Flight 
4). 
 
When server receives ClientHello with cookie it verifies the cookie and if it is 
valid generates random number and sends it in ServerHello message with 
ServerHelloDone (Flight 4). Client, in its turn, generates master secret and 
sends ClientKeyExchange that contains psk_identity, ChangeCipherSpec, and 
Finish message that contains all previous messages encrypted with generated 
master secret (Flight 5). The psk_identity field identifies the key that server 
should use for a handshake. It is used only in PSK mode. Upon receiving 
Flight 5 server verifies the content of the Finish message and replies with 
ChangeCipherSpec, and Finish messages (Flight 6). 
 
2.4 Constrained application protocol (CoAP) 
 
On the application layer HTTP is commonly used for most applications that 
implement a client/server model. At the same time this protocol is supposed 
to run over reliable transport (like TCP) and cannot be used over UDP. 
Moreover running HTTP protocol may require too much computational 
resources (like parsing HTTP headers, form parameters end, etc) for a 
constrained device and does not take into account models that are used in the 
IoT (e.g. multicast, and unconfirmed requests). In order to overcome these 
issues a new protocol CoAP [3] is being designed generally as a subset of 
HTTP protocol that can be used over UDP transport.  CoAP takes into account 
constrained computational resources of microcontrollers and scenarios of 
machine-to-machine communications [3]. The main conceptual difference of 
CoAP from HTTP is a message abstraction that determines the type of request 
or response. 
 
• A confirmable message request is sent when client is supposed to get a 
response or delivery confirmation. The response can be an 
acknowledgement message or non-confirmable message or both of 
them. 
• A non-confirmable message request is send when client does not expect 
a confirmation of request. 
• An acknowledgement message is sent as a response to confirm that 
request was delivered. It may contain additional data or be empty. 
• A reset message is sent as a response to confirmable or not confirmable 
node to notify that request was received but some data was missed. 
Usually it happens when server node was restarted. 
 
CoAP draft recommends using DTLS protocol to secure network traffic. In this 
case DTLS is running above transport layer (UDP) and below the CoAP. In 
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addition to NoSec mode when no security support is provided, following 
security modes are defined. 
 
• Pre-Shared Keys [5]. In this mode symmetric keys are provided to 
client and server before the start of DTLS handshake. It is based on 
symmetric cryptography. 
• Raw public key certificates [6]. This mode utilizes asymmetric 
cryptography algorithms (in particular Elliptic Curve Cryptography). 
Client and server are supposed to be provided with asymmetric key pair 
but not in X.509 format 
• X.509 Certificates mode is the same as raw public key certificates with 
only difference that public keys are supposed to be provided in X.509 
format. 
 
2.5 Alternative approach over UDP 
 
A different protocol stack that can potentially replace CoAP/DTLS in some IoT 
applications that are supposed to work with streams of data is being 
developed by Google. This protocol stack includes SPDY [9] protocol that is 
supposed to replace HTTP protocol.  SPDY is supposed to be used over TCP 
but Quick UDP Internet Connection (QUIC) [10] protocol is being developed 
to replace TCP and improve streams multiplexing.   
 
To secure QUIC connections Google offers a new QUIC Crypto [11] protocol. 
QUIC Crypto is based on TLS protocol but at the same time is designed to 
optimize handshake round trip time (RTT) and has following main 
differences. 
 
• No PSK mode is specified. Only asymmetric cryptography is used and 
keys are provided as X.509 certificates. 
• The key exchange is based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol but server 
does not generate a new random number for each handshake. The 
server number is stored in server config and remains the same for a 
long period of time. 
• Ciphersuite is also predefined in server config (for now only AES-GCM 
is available). 
 
At the same time the goal of QUIC and QUIC crypto is to optimize the 
bandwidth rather than to minimize resources utilization for constrained 
devices. For example 0-RTT handshake is supposed to RSA digital signatures 
which can be resource consuming and long messages may cause package 
fragmentation in 802.15.4 networks.   
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3 Problem statement 
 
As mentioned above devices that are connected to the IoT are highly 
constrained in memory and computational power. Moreover, 802.15.4-based 
networks are lossy, have low bandwidth and high latency. In this case, 
maintaining access control policy information inside these devices can be 
difficult and evaluating access control requests may be expensive (especially if 
it requires network lookup). The situation becomes even worse if the number 
of potential clients that have an access to a device is high and these clients are 
dynamically changing, hence control policies cannot be statically 
preconfigured in nodes. Hence, the access control information should be 
managed in some server outside of the device with minimum direct 
communication between the server and device. At the same time, access 
control for the internet connected devices that utilize CoAP protocol can have 
2 levels of granularity.  
 
• Device level access, when any agents that have remote access to the 
device have full access rights to it resources. 
• Resource level access, when each request is supposed to be verified 
against access control information. 
 
As each node in IoT often perform very specific function (e.g. remote 
temperature sensing, control of a power switch, etc.) resource level access 
control is not always necessary and device level control is often enough.  
 
As mentioned above, CoAP specification defines the utilization of DTLS 
protocol for authentication and secure communication. So DTLS can also be 
used for solving the device level access control problem. If DTLS connection 
can be established then agent is granted full access to the device resources 
otherwise access is denied. 
 
CoAP defines 3 possible secure modes [3] - Pre-Shared Keys (PSK) [5], Raw 
public key (RPK) [6], X.509 Certificates. In X.509 Certificate mode a sensor 
node is provided with one or more public keys that can be used to verify 
previously unknown X.509 certificate. From one side this mode makes 
possible to manage the dynamic access to the node without key reprovisioning 
by issuing signed certificates to authorized agents. But from the other side the 
certificate cannot be withdrawn before it is expired. The certificate expiration 
check requires the device to be able to synchronize and maintain the real time 
clock that is not always possible for a constrained device, Moreover this mode 
can be too resource consuming for highly constrained devices because of the 
size of certificates and time for signature verification. 
 
At the same time in PSK or RPK modes keys are supposed to be provisioned to 
device. Keys can be provisioned in a secure way, either manually or remotely 
via secure channel. At the same time in some applications (like pay-per-use 
systems) the fast dynamic access management is a crucial requirement. 
Therefore new ways for dynamic authorization managements should be 
designed, evaluated, and analyzed. 
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The main goal of this thesis is to define the access control framework that can 
be built on top of the DTLS protocol running in PSK mode and evaluate this 
framework of the hardware platform that have limited computational 
resources. 
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4 Related work 
 
Previously, various access control solutions that allow the dynamic access 
management have been proposed for different IoT application scenarios. 
 
Zhang et. al. [12] propose the solution for dynamic access allocation. In this 
approach the device owner provides clients with one time token that can be 
used to access device in the network. This paper describes different 
approaches to perform token reuse detection. Some of these approaches 
involve replication of reused tokens and some suggest distributed token 
storage. Also, a defense for possible man in the middle attack is suggested. At 
the same time this access token verification is based on verification of digital 
signature using RSA algorithm that may be time and resource consuming for 
constrained devices.  
 
The proposal described in [13] applies usage control model for the IoT. This 
approach maps the UCON abstractions to IoT entities and is based on fuzzy 
theory. Unfortunately there are only few experiment present that does not 
provide enough data of evaluation of the approach on IoT nodes.  
 
The work presented in [14] demonstrates delegated capability based approach 
and based on UDP and CoAP protocols. The general principle is shown on 
Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Distributed capability-based approach [14] 
 
Access tokens are provided by issuer to a client with ECC digital signature in 
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format. A token contains information 
about resource to access, action that can be executed and additional 
conditions that is supposed to be checked by device. Server verifies digital 
signature and performs operation if permissions are granted by token. 
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Authors also evaluated their approach and measured that each operation 
requires 480.96ms in total and 89.1% is dedicated for cryptographic 
computations. Taking into account that access control check is required for 
each request, this overhead is quite big in terms of power efficiency and 
computational time. 
 
4.1 Lightweight Machine to Machine 
 
None of the papers mentioned above addresses the authentication and 
communication security problems. An interesting access control solution is 
being developed by Open Mobile Alliance (OMA). OMA is a standards body 
that develops protocols and standards for mobile devices and cellular 
networks. The lightweight machine to machine protocol (LWM2M) is 
described in [15]. It includes authorization, authentication, and channel 
security protocols definition. Moreover it was designed to support CoAP as an 
application level protocol. In this approach UDP is supposed to be secured 
with DTLS but 2 additional ciphersuites must be supported by 
implementation:     
 
• TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 
 
The security policy of the device is managed by centralized Bootstrap Server. 
The access control solution is described in details. It is defined in terms of 
Server Account (SA), Resource, Object and Object entity, Access Control 
Object and Access Control Object Instance. Clients are authenticated based on 
their SA. SA may be provisioned manually or via Bootstrap Server. Resources 
are entities that are supposed to perform different operations on Objects or 
Object Instances and liked with Objects or Object Instances. The initial 
provisioning grants to certain clients the right to perform the create operation 
on the certain Object and create a new Object Instance.  The client that creates 
object instance is an Object Owner and can grant or revoke privileges to 
perform different operations on Object to other clients. 
 
In spite of the fact, that protocol [15] is very well defined and supports 
different levels of access control and flexible privileges management it may be 
too complicated to be implemented in constrained devices. Moreover the 
centralized key provisioning from bootstrap server is not a useful solution for 
pay-per-use systems. 
 
4.2 Delegated CoAP Authentication and Authorization Framework 
(DCAF) 
 
In addition to papers mentioned above, some interesting solutions are 
proposed to Internet Engineering Task Force organization (IETF). One 
interesting approach is Delegated CoAP Authentication and Authorization 
Framework (DCAF) [16]. This draft addresses authentication, secure 
communications, and authorization problems for securing CoAP protocol. 
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DTLS protocol in PSK mode is used for authentication and secure 
communication. DCAF defined 4 agents:  
 
• Client (C), may be constrained or not constrained device, 
• Authorization Manager (AM), performs authorization request for 
client,  
• Resource Server (RS), object that is supposed to be accessed 
• Authorization Server (AS),  
 
In general case client obtains authorization ticket in JSON from format 
authorization server using authorization manager for selected resource server. 
The ticket consists of 2 parts - Face and Verifier. Verifier contains the key for 
C-RS secure communication and is supposed to be used only by client. Face in 
its turn contains authorization information and may contain C-RS key. If face 
contains key it is supposed to be encrypted with common key K_AS-RS.  
 
Secured connection between client and RS is installed in PSK mode. Face part 
of the ticket is provided to RS in psk_identity field as JSON string 
representation or base64 encoding of encrypted object. RS either decrypt 
psk_identity or uses HMAC to generate a key. 
 
The protocol described above is very well detailed. At the same time the 
procedure of access token grant looks controversial (that may happen in 
protocol draft). The ticket is requested for one resource and one or more 
actions on that resource but is granted in form of some abstract role and 
relations between resource, actions and a role are not specified.  
 
The main problem of the protocol is that it grants an access to only one 
resource on RS. Hence, if client has an access to more than one resource then 
it is supposed either to maintain a few sessions to rehandshake every time it 
needs to access new resource (which can be expensive and time consuming).  
 
4.3 Access Control Framework for Constrained Environments 
 
One more interesting protocol that can be found in IETF drafts is Access 
Control Framework for Constrained Environments [17]. As well as DCAF, this 
approach is proposed for CoAP and DTLS protocols. Protocol draft defines 2 
levels of access control: 
 
• Protocol authorization where server makes a decision if it should run a 
requested protocol with certain client. 
• Resource authorization where server allows or denies performing an 
operation on the requested resource for certain client. 
 
Protocol authorization does not require resource authorization but resource 
authorization requires some protocol authorization.  
 
Protocol identifies 5 agents in the system: 
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• Original Client (OC) emphasizing that real client may be hidden behind 
the middleware. 
• Authorization Manager (AM) that requests access token. 
• Authorization Server (AM) that is in charge for token request 
verification and token issuing. 
• Resource Server (RS) constrained device that contains resources. 
• Resource Owner that specifies the access policy for AS. 
 
The OC using the AM obtains access token that includes CoAP resource 
identifier, CoAP action, OC identifier, AS identifier, additional conditions that 
specify if token can be accepted. In addition to information above token may 
contain sequence number that is maintained per RS to protect token from 
replay attack. The token is provided in JSON format and is supposed to be 
signed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [18] or encrypted with JSON Web 
Encryption [19] (JWE) if it is send over an insecure channel. 
 
The OC can transfer the token to the RS either using TLS Authorization 
Extension [20] or using specific CoAP resource. Resource URI should be 
defined as './well-known/core/authz/' or using a specific location on the RS, 
supplied by the AS. The token is verified upon receiving. During verification 
process RS checks if token was revoked, if issuer is reliable and if signature is 
correct.  
 
The authorization process occurs upon receiving the request. RS verifies that 
token is not expired, that token is bound to the requested subject and that 
token is authorized to perform the operation on resource (including action 
and local condition). 
 
4.4. Summary 
 
The review of the above solutions shows in spite of the fact that many 
researches are working on the problem the solid and reliable solution does not 
still exists. Some of the researchers like [12], [13], [14] develop interesting but 
not detailed and evaluated solutions. The solution proposed by OMA is very 
detailed but too computationally complicated to be implemented for a sensor 
node. DCAF and [17] may be defined for resource control level only and 
cannot be applied in the case when only device access level need to be applied. 
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5 Solution overview 
 
One possible solution for the problem stated in Chapter 3 is described in [21]. 
Authors of this draft propose 2 dynamic access control modes for applications 
that are based on CoAP and DTLS protocols.  
 
• Derived key (DK) mode is based on PSK mode and provides dynamic 
access based on symmetric key cryptography. 
• Authorized public key mode is based on RPK mode and involves 
asymmetric cryptography computations. 
 
Both suggested modes are designed for device level access control (client that 
has access to the device can access any resource on the device). Since the goal 
of the thesis is to find a solution for the problem that requires minimum 
resources than derived key mode is more promising and will be described in 
details and evaluated. 
 
In this solution 3 types of agents are identified. 
 
• Resource Server (RS) is an object (constrained device) that hosts CoAP 
resources. 
• Client (C) is a subject (device) that connects to Resource Server in order 
to access one or more resources. 
• Trusted Anchor (TA) is server that has trust relations with Resource 
Servers and at the same time keeps access control policy that regulates 
clients’ access to resource servers. 
 
5.1 General workflow 
 
The derived key mode resembles the PSK mode with the difference that keys 
are not explicitly provided to the RS. Instead RS and TA share the common 
secret key (KRS-TA ) that is not known to any third party. The workflow for DK 
mode is shown on the figure 5.1.  
 
In the initial step client has to request an access token from the TA. The access 
token consists of 2 parts: a key that will be used between the client and the RS 
(KRS-C) that is a binary value of 128 or 256 bits, and a nonce. The access token 
is supposed to be sent over a secure channel in spite it is not mentioned in the 
protocol. 
 
After receiving an access token the client can initialize a DTLS connection with 
RS. The connection is initialized in the PSK mode. The KRS-C key is kept in 
secret and used as PSK while the nonce is sent to the RS in psk_identity field 
of ClientKeyExchange message. Upon receiving the nonce, RS can generate 
KRS-C from nonce and KRS-TA and successfully complete a handshake. 
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Figure 5.1. 
 
Protocol draft [8] does not define precise format of the access token. Also, 
authorization and authentication of the client by TA is not in the scope of the 
document. 
 
5.2 Nonce content and format 
 
Nonce contains necessary information that RS needs to authorize the 
connection: client identifier, identifier of TA that issued the token, sequence 
number of nonce per RS (this sequence number is incremented every time a 
new nonce is generated for certain RS). As psk_identity field in 
ClientKeyExchange have to be a UTF-8 string then nonce have to be sent in a 
string format.  In the protocol draft the following parts are defined:  
 
• The constant nonce prefix “DK” which implies to RS that derived key 
mode is supposed to be used. 
• TA identifier that is represented in string format or converted to string 
format. 
• Client identifier that is represented in string format or converted to 
string format. 
• Sequence number that is 32 bit integer converted to string format. 
 
Parts of the nonce mentioned above are concatenated in sequence they are 
mentioned using a splitter symbol “.”. Example of the nonce is shown on the 
figure 5.2. 
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DK.TA_1.Client_1.5 
 
Figure 5.2. Nonce Example 
 
5.3 Calculation of the key 
 
Both TA and RS derive the KRS-C key using the nonce and the KRS-TA key based 
on HMAC that utilizes SHA256 hash function [22]. The key is calculated using 
the equation 5.1 where KRS-TA is HMAC secret and nonce is HMAC data. 
 
KRS-C = HMAC(KRS-TA, nonce) ……………………………(5.1)  
 
HMAC produces the 256 bit value that can be used completely or truncated to 
the most significant 128 bits. 
 
5.4 Key expiration and anti-replay protection 
 
In order to protect the nonce from reuse and implement a key expiration 
authors offer a to use sliding window based on the sequence number. The RS 
must maintain the list of minimum 32 (recommended 64) recent sequence 
numbers where maximum number is the biggest sequence number that was 
used. Each time the RS receives the nonce it has to validate if this number is 
bigger than the minimum number in the list, marked as unused in sliding 
window or bigger than maximum number that was used. So if the sequence 
number value is less than smallest value in the list than the key is considered 
to be expired and if the number is marked as used the RS assumes that this is 
a replay attack. 
 
5.5 Key revocation 
 
If TA needs to revoke the key that was not expired or terminate existing 
session it sends a request to RS with sequence number of a key that is 
supposed to be revoked. Upon request RS marks the certain sequence number 
in sliding window as used and terminates the active DTLS session if any. 
 
5.5 Theoretical analysis 
 
The protocol described above is a solid and well defined concept. The first 
important advantage of this protocol is a narrow application area. Unlike 
DCAF this protocol utilizes DTLS authentication to control access at the 
device level where all resources hosted on the RS are available to any client 
that has a right to connect. That makes it possible to access different resources 
without re-handshake or keeping additional sessions alive.  
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It is worth noting that this protocol neither make/require any changes in the 
DTLS standard nor in the CoAP standard draft. In practice that means that no 
modifications in DTLS or CoAP implementation libraries required and the 
protocol may be implemented on top of already existing code. 
 
At the same time suggested protocol has a few drawbacks. First, this protocol 
does not offer any solution for resource level access control. But that can be 
considered as minor disadvantage because this framework can be built 
separately or on top of the existing protocol.  
 
The second important concern is content and a format of the nonce. In 
addition to the existing data (TA identity, client identity, and sequence 
number) it may be good to add the key size (as it was mentioned above it can 
be 128 or 256 bits) to improve flexibility. The format of the nonce can become 
a problem when it comes to fields separation with special symbol “.” and 
identifying derived key mode by sequence of 2 symbols at the beginning of the 
nonce. Defining a special symbol (or a sequence of symbols) as a separator 
may introduce bugs in implementation and settings parts. Mode recognition 
by sequence of symbols may lead to mistakes when the key in the PSK mode is 
defined starting with the same sequence of bytes. 
 
In order to improve the protocol the nonce could be redefined in form of 
binary structure (Table 5.2). The total size of the structure is 37 bytes. The first 
3 bytes are the constant sequence 0x0C, 0x44, 0x4A that identifies the DK 
mode. The fourth byte is the identifier of the Trusted Anchor. Next sequence 
of 12 bytes is a client identifier is followed by 12 bytes of resource server 
identifier. Key size defines the size of the key that is supposed to be used 0 
stands for 128 bits and 1 for 256 bits. The last 8 bytes of the structure is a 
sequence number of the key.  
 
Table 5.2. Structure of the binary nonce 
 
Field Size (bytes) Comment 
dk_id 3 Identifier of the derived key mode. 
ta_id 1 Identity of the TA as number 
client_id 12 Identity of the client as number 
rs_id 12 Identity of resource server 
key_size 1 size of the key to generate 
sequence_num 8 64 bit sequence number 
 
The purpose of RS identifier is additional protection in case to resource 
servers have the same key KRS-TA. In this situation if the RS identifier is not 
present in the nonce a client can generate a nonce and key for one device and 
then use it to access another device. 
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Unfortunately it is not possible to send a binary structure in the psk_identity 
field of the ClientKeyExchange message according to TLS standard 
specification. We see 2 ways to overcome this problem. 
 
The first possible solution for the first problem is to define the extension using 
standard TLS extensions filed in the ClientHello message. In this case the 
ClientKeyExchange message may contain a client string name in the 
psk_identity and binary structure defined above can be sent using the 
extension_data field of the ClientHello. The main disadvantage of this method 
is that it requires the additional TLS extension definition, that cause the 
changes in DTLS implementation both on client and on all RS.  
 
One more possible solution is to represent a binary structure as a string to 
send it in the ClientKeyexchange message. That can be achieved by using 
some standard encoding algorithm that can convert binary representation to 
string like base64 [23].  
 
The approach that utilized base64 encoding seems to be more promising than 
one that defines additional DTLS extension because it does not require any 
CoAP or DTLS code modifications of a well-designed library. In general case, 
it cannot be predicted how the key could be obtained so designers of the DTLS 
library have to define a way to extend key retrieval without internal code 
modification. Hence, it can emphasize that the DK mode is suitable even for 
proprietary libraries that doesn't provide access to source code.  
 
The protocol draft contains only general description of the key revocation 
mechanism. We can improve the protocol by defining this part in more 
details. The request for key revocation does have to contain the TA identifier 
and RS identifier together with sequence number of a key that have to be 
revoked. This message can be send using DTLS session in pure PSK mode but 
the DTLS handshake has too much overhead. Moreover the constrained 
device has limited slots for DTLS sessions so the handshake will not be always 
possible.  
 
Since the information that is contained in the key revocation request is not 
confidential but has to be authenticated we suggest avoiding establishing of a 
secure connection and protect the message with Message Authentication Code 
(MAC) based on the HMAC algorithm. The MAC can be computed with key 
KRS-TA so it can be easily verified on a constrained device. 
 
The structure of the key revocation request is shown in the table 5.3. It starts 
with 1 byte of the TA identifier followed by 12 bytes of the RS identifier and 8 
bytes sequence number. The last 32 bytes is a message authentication code 
computed based on information in the structure with key KRS-TA.  
 
Table 5.3. Structure of the key revocation request. 
Field Size (bytes) Comment 
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ta_id 1 Identity of the TA as number 
rs_id 12 Identity of resource server 
sequence_num 8 64 bit sequence number 
MAC 32 message authentication code 
 
The key revocation request can be send over any standard or custom 
application level protocol. If CoAP protocol is supposed to be used on the 
device then specific endpoint should be defined for key revocation and 
message should be sent as a payload of ACK request. 
 
The solution that is defined above including refinement for the nonce and key 
revocation will be implemented and evaluated further. 
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6 Implementation details 
 
In order to verify and evaluate the protocol 3 agents that were defined in the 
previous chapter have to be implemented. 
 
• The client is implemented in Java as a desktop application. 
• The Trusted Anchor (TA) is implemented in Java as a web service 
application. 
• The Resource Server (RS) is implemented in C on a constrained 
hardware platform. 
 
Deployment of applications is shown on the figure 6.1.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Deployment of applications. 
 
TA is running on a web server. The client is running on a desktop computer or 
a laptop and sends HTTP requests to the TA over a secure internet connection. 
The client is also connected to the Border Router (BR) over the serial port 
utilizing Serial Line Internet Protocol (SLIP). The RS, in its turn, is connected 
to the BR over 802.15.4 low power radio. 
 
6.1 Resource server implementation 
 
The resource server development is includes not only the design and 
implementation of a solution that was described in Chapter 5 but also the 
selection of the hardware platform, the operating system (OS) and necessary 
libraries.  
 
6.1.2 Hardware platform 
 
The resource server is supposed to be implemented on the hardware platform 
that has limited resources so it can be considered a constrained node. But at 
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the same time it should provide enough memory and computational power to 
run the operating system, IP stack, DTLS, CoAP protocol as well as access 
control implementation and test application. The 16 bit processors can 
address up to 64K of memory that is probably not enough to keep all this 
components. Hence, 32 bit hardware platforms need to be used. One more 
important requirement for the platform is presence of the 802.15.4 radio unit. 
2 platforms were found that meet requirements above ST32W [24] and 
CC2538 [25]. Both of these platforms are based on 32 bit ARM-Cortex M3 
core, have the built in 802.15.4 radio unit and the same about of flash and 
Random Access Memory (RAM). The main benefit of the CC2538 is presence 
of the more advanced accelerator of cryptographic operations that supports 
SHA2 and AES-128/256 while ST32W supports only AES-128 hardware 
acceleration. One more important advantage of the CC2638 is a hardware 
pseudo random number generator that can be initialized with random number 
generated by radio module. Due to the benefits above the CC2538 was chosen 
as hardware platform. 
 
The development kit CC2538DK [26] that is based on CC2538 was used for 
implementation and evaluation. The development board has following 
relevant characteristics. 
 
• processor - CC2538F512RKU 
• flash - 512Kb 
• RAM - 32Kb 
• clock frequency - 32MHz,  
• the voltage - 2.1V  
• the processor core current - 13 mA  
• oscillator frequency - 32.768kHz. 
 
Moreover, the CC2538DK development board has 4 built in LEDs, 
accelerometer and a light sensor [27] that helps to build a test application for 
protocol evaluation. 
 
6.1.1 Operating system 
 
The OS is necessary in order to simplify the development of the test bed and 
avoid custom implementation of different services (like the IP stack). At the 
same time operating system is supposed to have small code overhead and 
good power efficiency. Two operating systems were considered as possible 
options: TinyOS [24] and Contiki OS [25]. 
 
For this project the Contiki OS version 2.7 was used. The Contiki OS is the 
open source, well maintained operation system that is designed especially for 
the IoT [26]. One of the important benefits of this operating system is a 
support for the communication IP protocol stack. It includes IPv6 (with 
6LoWPAN), TCP and UDP protocols. The Contiki OS provides option to 
switch off unused units of the communication stack. For our implementation 
we do not include TCP and leave only IPv6 (with 6LoWPAN) and UDP 
protocols. 
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One more advantage of the Contiki OS is the implementation of the simple 
multithreading concept called protothreads that from the one side simplifies 
implementation and from the other side has small code overhead and is not 
demanding to computational resources [27].   
 
Moreover the Contiki OS also implements various Radio Duty Cycling (RDC) 
protocols. Devices that utilize RDC keep the radio off most of the time and 
waking up in periods (constant or variable) to check if there any nodes that 
are ready for communication. As a radio unit is the most power consuming 
part of the constrained device using RDC can be a great energy saving option. 
The ContikiOS supports XMAC, CXMAC and its own ContikiMAC protocols. 
As the ContikiMAC provides the best energy saving characteristics (it keeps 
the radio off 99% of the time [28]) this RDC protocol was chosen for the test 
bed implementation. 
 
In addition to this, the Contiki OS comes with built in CoAP implementation 
Erbium [29]. It supports both server and client modes and has a small code 
overhead. For the used version of operating system Erbium implemented the 
version 13 of CoAP protocol draft that has only minor differences with the 
latest version 17 that was available for the moment of this thesis.  
 
One more important benefit is that the Contiki OS provides built in JSON 
support that might be helpful for evaluation of possible solutions that involve 
access tokens in JSON format.  
  
6.1.2 DTLS library 
 
The DTLS implementation that can be used in a test bed is supposed to fit 
following requirements. At first, as a DTLS library has to run on the 
constrained hardware platform it should be implemented in C and it should be 
an open source solution so it can be easily optimized. The second important 
requirement is that DTLS implementation has to support PSK mode and in 
the best case TLS_PSK_AES_128_CCM_8 ciphersuite. From a variety of 
existing implementations GnuTLS [30], MatrixSSL [31] and tinyDTLS [32] 
were considered as possible options. Finally, the tinyDTLS library was chosen 
because it not only meets all the requirements mentioned above but also has 
Contiki OS support and is optimized in size and performance for constrained 
devices.  
 
At the same time a few modifications had to be implemented.  
 
• The code for TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 and 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) support was disabled for 
compilation to reduce the code footprint. 
• The software base pseudo random number generation (PRGN) was 
replaced with hardware accelerator for PRNG generation. 
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• Functions that utilize the SHA2 hardware accelerator for HMAC 
calculation were implemented to replace the software based SHA256 
calculation. 
• DTLS session handler was extended to keep a pointer for custom 
information and search of existing session by custom information. 
• The new event DTLS_EVENT_CLOSED was declared. This event is 
send when the DTLS session is about to be closed but session 
information was not removed yet. It can be handled by the event 
function together with DTLS_EVENT_CONNECTED. 
• The function that destroys the DTLS session and can be called outside 
of the tinyDTLS module was implemented as a part of DTLS. 
 
Modifications and extensions mentioned above are not application specific 
and have to be supported by the DTLS implementation so we treat this code as 
part of the DTLS library and not our application. 
 
6.1.3 DTLS and CoAP integration 
 
In order to develop a test bed, the tinyDTLS library was integrated in the 
Erbium application. DTLS support was implemented as an option and can be 
disabled or enabled in compile time. The following modifications were made 
in Erbium CoAP implementation. 
 
At first support for 2 UDP connections was added to Erbium. One connection 
is supposed to be secured with DTLS while another handles insecure requests. 
In order to prevent insecure CoAP calls to resources that are supposed to be 
protected the additional resource flag IS_SECURE was declared and can be 
used to prevent resource from insecure access. 
 
Callback methods of the tinyDTLS library get_from_peer and send_to_peer, 
which are used to process data from upper level protocol and send data with 
lower level protocol respectively, were implemented in Erbium. The 
get_from_peer delegates requests to coap_receive method that is a part of 
Erbium and implements CoAP message processing. The send_to_peer 
method, in its turn, sends data over the UDP protocol. 
 
As the Erbium implementation can have only one instance per processor one 
dtls_context global variable was added, that handles pointers to callback 
methods. It was initialized with get_from_peer and send_to_peer methods 
mentioned above and get_key method, provided from the test application, 
that returns a key depending on PSK identity.  
 
The coap_receiver thread is responsible for receiving data from lower level 
protocol and delegating processing to coap_receive method. In order to 
implement DTLS integration data processing was delegated to the 
dtls_handle_message method that is a part of tinyDTLS library. At the same 
time in coap_send_message the code for sending data over UDP protocol was 
replaced with call of dtls_write method. The general structure is shown on 
Figure 6.2. 
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The coap_receiver process receives the new packet and checks by destination 
port number if it has to be processed as secure or insecure. If the data was sent 
to insecure CoAP connection the request is processed as any other CoAP 
request by coap_receive method. The only difference from initial protocol 
implementation is the additional check of IS_SECURE flag of target resource. 
If the data was sent to DTLS connection dtls_handle_message method is 
called for further processing. The dtls_handle_message in its turn checks if 
the message belongs to DTLS protocol. Then if the message belongs to the 
record protocol it is decoded and processed with the coap_receive method. In 
case a response is supposed to be send that response is encoded and sent back 
to a client. If the received message is a handshake or alert message it is 
processed with the logic of the DTLS protocol. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Message processing flowchart. 
 
6.1.4 Key derivation 
 
The key derivation logic implemented as the function that accepts the PSK 
identity and length of the PSK identity in bytes and returns the status of the 
operation (0 if key is generated and non 0 if an error occured), the key, the 
length of the key in bytes, the TA identifier and the sequence number from the 
nonce. The key derivation flowchart is shown on the Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3. Key derivation flowchart. 
 
In order to prevent redundant base64 decoding, the function verifies that the 
length of the PSK identity field is at least 37 (the size of a nonce) but does not 
exceed 60 bytes (the maximum length of nonce Base64 encoding). If the 
length of PSK identity is within the acceptable limit the nonce is decoded from 
Base64. If the result of the decoding is exactly 37 bytes than data of the nonce 
is verified in the following order. 
 
• First 3 bytes of the nonce identify the key mode and are equal to 0x0C, 
0x44, 0x4A 
• RS identifier specified in the nonce is equal to the RS identifier of the 
device. 
• The TA identity is known to the device and sequence number of the 
nonce satisfies requirements of the sliding window of the specified TA. 
  
If all checks of the nonce are successful then the derived key is generated and 
truncated if it is required by the key size parameter of the nonce. As the 
implemented access control protocol is designed to be used together with the 
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DTLS protocol the key generation function utilize the HMAC calculation 
module of the tinyDTLS library to reduce the code footprint. 
6.1.5 Sliding window 
 
The sliding window has a size of 64 values as recommended by the protocol 
specification. It is implemented as a structure and contains 2 integer variables 
(window and sequence_number). Each variable is  64 bit size. The 
sequence_number variable contains the smallest sequence number known by 
the window. The window variable, in its turn, represents the status of used 
keys for the sequence of next 64 numbers. Each bit can be either 0 what 
means that the key was not used or 1 what means that the key was already 
used.  Bits are numbered from the less significant bit to the most significant 
bit so the bit number 0 represents the status of the key with the sequence 
number equal to sequence_number field. The most significant bit represents 
the status for the key with the number sequence_number+63.  
 
The verification of a nonce with the sliding window is implemented in a 
following way. 
 
• If the sequence number provided with the nonce is less than the 
sequence_number value of the sliding window then the nonce have to 
be ignored. 
• If the sequence number provided with the nonce is greater than 
sequence_number + 63 than nonce can be accepted. 
• If the sequence number provided with the nonce is between the 
sequence_number and sequence_number + 63 then nonce can be 
accepted if respective bit in the window variable is set to 0. 
 
The key is marked as used in the sliding window either when the DTLS 
handshake is complete or when the key revocation request is received. If the 
sequence number provided with the nonce is greater than sequence_number 
+ 63 than the window variable is set to 0 and the sequence_number variable 
is updated with the new sequence number. Otherwise if a sequence number is 
in between of the sequence_number value and sequence_number + 63 than 
the respective bit of the window variable is set to 1. If the sequence_number 
variable of the sliding window is greater than the sequence number of a key 
that have to be marked as used then the sliding window is not updated. 
 
6.1.6 Key revocation 
 
The key revocation is implemented as a CoAP resource that is not protected 
with transport security. The resource utilizes the DELETE method of the 
CoAP protocol and the request is sent as a row sequence of bytes in the 
payload. The request is not encrypted but protected with the MAC. As HMAC 
calculation may cost significant computational resources, following conditions 
are verified when the new key revocation request is received. 
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• The RS identity specified in the request has to be equal the resource 
identity of the device. 
• Either the DTLS session for the sequence number specified in the key 
revocation request exists or key is marked as unused in sliding window. 
 
If verification above was successful the MAC is calculated with key KRS-TA and 
compared with the received MAC. In case if the message sender identity is not 
confirmed the request is ignored. Otherwise the sliding window is updated 
and the DTLS session is removed if it exists. 
 
6.1.6 Test application 	  
The test application is implemented as a CoAP resource that is protected with 
the DTLS protocol and performs a simple function of switching Light-
Emitting Diod (LED) on the evaluation board.  
 
In addition to this it defines callback functions for the tinyDTLS context and 
on_event function that handles tinyDTLS events. This function updates 
sliding window information when the DTLS handshake is finished and session 
is marked as connected. It also releases memory for custom information that 
is sticked to the session when the session is about to be closed. 
 
The get_psk_key callback function is called by the tinyDTLS when it needs a 
PSK for the DTLS handshake. The implemented handler supports both pure 
PSK mode and derived key mode. 
 
The test application also contains service code to configure the DTLS context 
and start CoAP server. 
 
6.2 Border router 
 
The border router is the CC2538DK board that is programmed with RPL 
border router application. That application can be found in Contiki OS 
examples. The router is connected to PC with the Serial Line Internet protocol 
(SLIP). In order to run the SLIP protocol the tunslip6 tool from Contiki 2.7 
distribution was used. This tool creates the additional network interface with 
the specified prefix and allows IP packet exchange between the PC and the 
RPL border router. 
 
6.3 Trusted anchor implementation 
 
The Trusted Anchor is implemented in Java as a web application that provides 
the REST service with 2 endpoints.  
 
The key generation endpoint (token/generate) creates the new nonce and 
derived key pairs. As input it accepts the JSON object that contains the alias of 
the client that sends the request and the alias of the resource server that needs 
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to be accessed. The TA finds existing RS and client identifiers by aliases in the 
database, generates the nonce and the key and increments the sequence 
number counter. The response is a string representation of the JSON object 
that contains nonce encoded as Base64 and a session key KRS-C. 
 
The key revocation endpoint (token/revoke) is designed to send key 
revocation requests. As input it accepts the JSON object that contains the alias 
of the resource server were the key have to be revoked and the sequence 
number of that key. The TA finds the the RS identifier by the alias and sends 
key revocation request to the selected RS. 
 
The REST service is secured with the TLS/SSL protocol based on generated 
X.509 certificates. Since our main goal is to evaluate the part of the protocol 
that have to run on the constrained devices we did not implement any 
authentication. 
 
6.4 Client implementation 
 
The client application is an application implemented in Java. It is designed to 
execute 3 main functions: 
 
• Obtain the nonce and the derived key KRS-C from the TA. 
• Perform the DTLS handshake with the RS using granted nonce. 
• Send the CoAP request over the DTLS record protocol to RS. 
 
The nonce and the derived key are obtained in a JSON object from the key 
generation endpoint. In order to implement the DTLS handshake and the 
secure CoAP communication we used Scandium open source DTLS 
implementation and Californium CoAP implementation. These frameworks 
were selected because they provide all necessary functionality and are easy to 
integrate. 
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7 Evaluation 	  
The implemented resource server part of the access control framework was 
evaluated on in terms of code size, memory usage, computational time and 
energy consumption. Since the nonce is transmitted in the psk_identity field 
of the ClientKeyExchange message the same as for normal PSK mode we 
assume zero transmission overhead for the key derivation mode.  
 
The evaluation was performed separately for key derivation and key 
revocation requests since those parts of the protocol are low coherent and can 
be redefined separately of each other. 	  
7.1 Evaluation methodology 	  
In order to evaluate code size and memory usage the arm-none-eabi-size 
utility was used. For more detailed information about RAM and ROM usage 
we used the tool arm-none-eabi-objdump. Both tools are included in the GNU 
toolchain for ARM processor utility. To perform a measurement for a certain 
functional part of the code that is in charge of specific functionality, it is 
removed from compilation with the #define C directive and the value is 
calculated as delta of the application size with and without the functional part. 
 
The computational time is measured with the contiki energest module. This 
module is based on the real time clock and measures usage time of different 
platform units separately (CPU time, CPU time in low power mode, radio 
listening time and radio transmission time). The real time clock on 
CC2538EM platform works on 32.786kHz frequency that allows to perform 
measurements with resolution 0.03 ms. The energest module accumulates the 
number of real time clock ticks in 64 bit unsigned values since its activation. 
That capacity is more than enough to measure the computational time of the 
most of access control operations. 
 
Energy consumption is calculated from time that is measured with the 
energest module according to the equation 7.1. 
 
E=U*I*t (7.1) 
 
In this equation U is a power supply voltage taken from platform 
documentation, I is an average current for the respective module from 
processor specification and t is the time value measured with the energest. 
The energy value is calculated for each model and then summed up to take 
into account not only energy used by processor for computation, but also 
potentially lost radio duty cycles. 
 
In order to evaluate how many requests can be send by an attacker per second 
we measured the Round Trip Time (RTT) between client and server with a 
ping request. As a ping request processing time is negligible and the network 
consists of two nodes so the route is deterministic we assume the One Way 
Delay (OWD) is a half of RTT. Hence, the number of requests that can be sent 
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by an attacker during the period of time is the length of the period divided by 
OWD.  
 
The measurements were performed with ContikiMAC radio duty cycle 
protocol.Java client running on the PC was sending either a DTLS handshake 
requests sequence or a key revocation request the RS running on the 
embedded platform depending on the evaluated function. Data was collected 
30 times for each function.  
 
The collected data were analysed to make a conclusion about performance of 
the access control framework and its resistance for Denial of Service (DoS) 
and Drain Battery Attack that are specific for constrained devices. 
 
7.2 Access control framework evaluation 	  
The total size of the access control framework is 1708 bytes including 1636 
bytes of code, 48 bytes of static information and 24 bytes allocated for global 
variables. This number also includes the 16 bytes long RS identifier and 78 
bytes long key KRS-TA. The part of the key revocation functionality is 392 bytes 
in total.  
 
The performance of the framework was measured separately for the key 
derivation function and for the key revocation function. Measurements results 
are presented in the table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1. Performance measurements of the key derivation and revocation. 
 Computation time 
(ms) 
Energy (µJ) 
Key derivation 2.30 62.79 
Key derivation with SHA2 
accelerator 
0.45 12.29 
Key revocation 2.25 61.43 
Key revocation with SHA2 
accelerator 
0.35 9.56 
 
The key derivation with software SHA256 computation takes in average 75.47 
ticks or 2.30 milliseconds while the same computation with SHA2 hardware 
accelerator takes 14.6 ticks or 0.45 milliseconds. The key revocation with and 
without SHA2 accelerator takes 73.7 ticks (2.25 ms) and 11.4 ticks (0.35 ms) 
respectively. 	  
7.3 DTLS evaluation 	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In order to compare the impact of the key derivation mode and SHA2 
accelerator on the DTLS handshake we measured the processing time for each 
message send by client. This time is measured starting from receiving the 
message and until the reply is sent. Moreover the total handshake time 
starting from the first ClientHello message and ending with processing of the 
last Finished message was measured to get an idea about the maximum 
number of handshakes that can be processed by the device within a unit of 
time. 
 
The total size of the tinyDTLS library (including the access control framework) 
is 21592 bytes. This code footprint includes 19368 bytes of program, 140 bytes 
of constant data and 2084 bytes allocated for global variables. 
 
Results of performance measurements are presented in the table 7.2  
 
Table 7.2. 
 Time 
(ms) 
Energy 
(µJ) 
Time (ms) 
with SHA2 
accelerator 
Energy (µJ) with 
SHA2 accelerator 
First ClientHello 2.32 63.29 0.72 19.80 
ClientHello with 
cookie 
3.55 96.78 1.32 35.99 
ClientKeyExchange 0.37 10.16 0.06 1.66 
ChangeCipherSpec 17.89 488.46 3.30 90.00 
Finished 9.96 271.99 2.65 72.40 
Total 38.64 1054.96 8.85 241.52 
 
The minimum time for the complete handshake for SHA256 software 
computation is 533.05 ms and average time is 775.05 ms. In case the SHA2 
hardware accelerator is used the minimum and average time is 511.65 ms and 
711.11 ms respectively. 	  
7.4 One way delay 	  
The average RTT value was 362.95 ms. Hence, the average OWD value is 
181.48 ms and we can assume that attacker can send 8.44 requests per second.  	  
7.5 Discussion 	  
Analysis of the access control framework code footprint shows that key 
derivation and revocation functions take 7.9% of the total DTLS 
implementation. The key derivation function takes 6.0% of total 
computational time per handshake. SHA2 hardware acceleration has a 
significant impact on the key derivation and revocation processing time for 
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DTLS handshake messages. The accelerator speeds up the key derivation 
computation 5.11 times and the key revocation computation 6.43 times. Also 
the accelerator speeds up overall computation time of the handshake 4.37 
times. 
 
We found out, by comparing overall handshake time with and without SHA2 
hardware acceleration, that optimization of the computational time has 
almost no impact on total handshake time. Hence, the key derivation has no 
significant impact on total DTLS handshake time. 	  
7.5.1 Attack analysis 	  
In order to analyze the access control framework for drain battery and DoS 
attacks we assume following conditions. 
 
• The constrained device uses the CR2032 coin battery with charge 
capacity 225 mAh [33] 
• The attacker can send 8.44 requests per second 
 
Battery drain attack can be performed either by sending the sequence of key 
revocation requests with well-structured valid data but wrong MAC or by 
series of attempts to perform a DTLS handshake with well-structured and 
acceptable nonce. 
 
In case an attacker tries to send key revocation requests we assume that 8.44 
requests per second can be transmitted. In this case the processor spends 0.07 
µAh (2.25 ms * 16 * 13 mA) of battery charge per second. In other words, it 
requires 38 days to drain the battery with this method, which means that this 
type of attack is almost unfeasible. 
 
In order to analyze the feasibility of the battery drain attack we assume the 
worst case that an attacker can perform a handshake in minimal handshake 
time (once in 0.5ms). The access control protocol requires the full DTLS 
handshake to be performed to authentify the client so we assume that requires 
38.64 ms to reject the client with valid the nonce and the invalid key. In this 
case the processor spends 0.28 µAh (38.64ms * 2 * 13 mA) of battery charge 
per second. Or in other words it requires 9.3 days of continuous sending to 
drain the battery that makes this attack unfeasible. 
 
A denial of service attack and be considered feasible and successful if an 
attacker can send a request to the resource server that makes it unresponsive. 
An attacker can perform this either by sending requests that require 
significant time to be processed or requests that block shared resources. As 
with battery drain attack we analyzed the if DoS attack is feasible either by 
sending key revocation requests or by performing a handshake.  
 
Processing of each key revocation request without SHA2 accelerator takes 2.3 
ms. Hence, the processor can service 434.7 requests per second that is much 
more that 8.44 requests per second that can be serviced by the network.  
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In DTLS handshake ChangeCipherSpec message requires the longest 
processing time of 17.89 ms. Hence, the processor can service 55.90 requests 
per second. That is more than amount of requests that can be transmitted over 
the network. So the DoS attack cannot be performed on the DTLS handshake. 
 
At the same time the problem comes from the DTLS protocol specification. 
The DTLS state machine is initialized on the Resource Server right after the 
ClientHello message with valid cookie is received. Since a constrained device 
can handle a very limited number of slots for DTLS sessions (in some cases 
the device can handle only 1 session) the potential attacker may perform a 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack by sending ClientHello messages and keeping 
all session slots busy. 	  
7.5.2 Protocol improvements. 	  
As was mentioned above that the protocol is well defined and doesn’t 
performs worse than the original DTLS handshake in PSK mode. But at the 
same time it has important drawbacks that have to be solved. 	  
Roles 	  
The first disadvantage is that access is supposed to be granted to all resources 
of the device while the resource server can contain different resources that is 
supposed to be accessed by different users (for example configuration 
resources that have to be accessed only by the device vendor and resources 
that can be accessed by the user). The number of these resources is usually 
limited. For this case we can offer to add the definition of roles to the 
framework.  
 
A set of roles that can access the resource is defined as a 64 bit integer value. 
In this case the number of a bit in the value identifies the role and the value of 
the bit means the access permission. If the bit is set to 1 if access permission is 
granted to the role and if it set to 0 then access is not granted. Each nonce, in 
its turn, contains additional a 64 bit integer that defines the set of roles that is 
assigned to the client. The same as for resources if user has a role the bit is set 
to 1 and to 0 otherwise. The set of roles is assigned to the DTLS session and 
verified for each request with bitwise ‘and’ operation. 
 
This approach has allows to define up to 64 different roles per resource server. 
That should be enough for a constrained device. It has only 8 bytes of 
communication overhead and a few instructions of computational overhead. 
Moreover this role base approach lets the client to access different resources 
without reestablishing DTLS handshake connection.  	  
Bulk key revocation 	  
In some cases it can be required by the Trusted Anchor to perform the key 
revocation procedure for multiple sequence numbers. The example of such 
case is an external request to TA to revoke all existing keys granted to the 
certain client on the certain resource server. TA has to send a set of revocation 
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requests to the specified device starting from the last generated key sequence 
number and continuing with all previous sequence numbers that meet the size 
of the sliding window. As the new MAC has to be generated for each request 
and the same data has to be send multiple times that procedure has significant 
communication and computation overhead. 
 
In order to improve the key revocation procedure we offer to change the key 
revocation request format so it contains instead of one sequence number the 
list of sequence numbers from the latest issued to the device and up to 63 
previous numbers if any for this device. The structure of new key revocation 
request is shown in the table 7.3. 	  
Table 7.3. Structure of the key revocation request. 
Field Size (bytes) Comment 
ta_id 1 Identity of the TA as number 
rs_id 12 Identity of resource server 
sn_lenght 2 Length of sequence numbers array 
sequence_nums [1..255] the array of 64 bit sequence numbers  
MAC 32 message authentication code 	  
In the table 7.3 ta_id, rs_id and MAC fields has the same meaning as before. 
The sn_lenght field is the number of sequence numbers sent within request 
and sequence_nums is the array of sequence numbers to be revoked. In this 
case we can reduce the computation time because all numbers are protected 
with same MAC so it is verified once and reduce the communication overhead 
as all numbers are sent within 1 request. The communication overhead in 
comparison with previous definition is negligible (2 bytes or 3.8% of the 
payload). 	  
Key derivation procedure. 	  
One more potential problem is the key derivation procedure. In case the client 
doesn’t know the key or uses the wrong key the device performs unnecessary 
computations (key material computation, encrypting a Finished message and 
decrypting client’s Finished message). This computational time can be 
significantly reduced if we change the nonce format and the key derivation 
procedure.  
 
In order to perform early authentication the existing nonce is complemented 
with HMAC of the binary part of the nonce. The new structure of the nonce is 
defined in the table 7.4. The dk_id, ta_id, client_id, rs_id and sequence_num 
fields are the same as before. The mac_and_key_size is split in 2 parts: 4 
MSBs can be 1 or 0 that means 256 bit or 128 bit MAC respectively and 4 LSBs 
can be 1 or 0 that means 256 bit or 128 bit generated key. 
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The MAC is generated by the TA with HMAC algorithm from the nonce and 
the key RS_TA and truncated if necessary. Then MAC is concatenated with 
the nonce and full nonce is encoded with Base64. The key C_RS is generated 
from the encoded nonce. 	  	  
 
Table 5.2. Structure of the binary nonce. 	  
	  
Upon receiving the nonce is decoded from Base64 and all necessary checks are 
performed. Then MAC of the nonce data computed and compared with the 
provided MAC. If verification fails no key is computed and the handshake is 
terminated.  
 
In order to analyse this solution we can assume that HMAC computation is 
preliminary equal to the key revocation request processing time and equal to 
2.25ms in average. At the same time nonce verification time is the same as key 
derivation time. Hence, the nonce verification, in case if the client knows the 
right key, requires additional 2.25ms or 5.78%. At the same time if the client 
uses wrong key the nonce verification saves more that 66.12% of 
computational efforts for wrong handshake. 	  
DoS attack on DTLS session slots 	  
As mentioned above there is a possible DoS attack on the DTLS protocol 
running on the constrained device with limited number of slots. In order to fix 
this approach with the access control framework it can be redefined as a DTLS 
extension. In this case the nonce information and verification data can be 
send in the extension_data field of the ClientHello. When the resource server 
receives the ClientHello message with valid server cookie and extension 
information the nonce is verified and state machine is create only in case if the 
nonce is valid. The nonce information have to be saved as a custom data for 
the DTLS handshake and used later when the ChangeCipherSpec message 
received to derive a session key. 
 
Field Size (bytes) Comment 
dk_id 3 Identifier of the derived key mode. 
ta_id 1 Identity of the TA as number 
client_id 12 Identity of the client as number 
rs_id 12 Identity of resource server 
mac_and_key_size 1 size of the key to generate 
sequence_num 8 64 bit sequence number 
Mac [16..32] MAC of the nonce 
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In addition to preventing the DoS attack definition of the access control 
framework as the DTLS extension makes possible to early validate erroneous 
and expired nonces. Moreover, sending nonce as a binary value allows to 
reduce the code footprint by removing Base64 decoding function (it takes 
preliminary 300 bytes). At the same time the implementation of DTLS 
extension may require modification of DTLS protocol code that not always 
possible.  
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8 Conclusion 
 
The intention of this thesis was to design and evaluate the access control 
protocol that is suitable for resource constrained devices that connect objects 
to the Internet of Things. We analyzed existing solutions and based our 
approach on the IETF draft that is based on the DTLS protocol in PSK mode. 
The draft was analyzed and a few improvements were offered before 
implementation and evaluation.   
 
The protocol was implemented and evaluated on CC2538 platform that 
includes the low power ARM Cortex M core and 802.15.4 radio module. This 
hardware configuration is commonly used in IoT applications. Evaluation 
results shows that the access control framework increased computational 
effort of the DTLS handshake by 6.0%, increases the code footprint of the 
DTLS implementation by 7.9% and has no effect on the overall handshake 
time. We found out by analyzing computational time that the protocol is not 
vulnerable to Deny of Service or Battery Drain Attack. 
 
Moreover, the DTLS handshake protocol in PSK mode was evaluated using the 
CC2538 platform and the ContikiMAC Radio Duty Cycle protocol. We found 
out the computational efforts required for processing handshake messages 
and average overall handshake time. We, also, compared results with software 
and hardware implementation of the SHA-2 hash function and found out that 
the hardware accelerator speeds up message processing computations in 4.37 
times but has no effect on overall handshake time. Analysis of attack 
vulnerability shows that with a limited number of session slots that is 
expected in IoT applications it is easily possible to make the device 
unresponsive for about 2 minutes. 
 
According to evaluation results we offered to add roles as the functional 
extension of the protocol. Moreover we suggest to improve the key derivation 
procedure to reduce computational efforts for processing fake or erroneous 
nonces and to improve the key revocation procedure to perform multiple key 
revocation in one request. In addition to this, we recommend to define access 
control protocol as a DTLS extension in order to prevent the Denial of Service 
Attack mentioned above. 
 
The resulting protocol is feasible to use in the IoT. We recommend this 
approach for application that require dynamic centralized access allocation, 
reliable user authentication and authenticated encryption of data transmitted 
in both directions. It is possible to use both with CoAP as the application level 
protocol and any other application level protocol that is built on top of UDP 
transport. The typical usage example can be pay-per-use applications in the 
IoT. 
 
8.1 Future work 
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In this thesis we focused on the scenario when one unconstrained device 
communicates (Client) with one constrained device (resource server). So it is 
desirable to complement the work with evaluation of the refined protocol for 
the case when both devices are constrained nodes. It is also interesting to 
evaluate the full time for the connection starting with sending the key 
generation request to the TA and up to the end of DTLS handshake. Since the 
protocol is designed to work only in single cast mode, after this evaluation we 
are planning to improve the protocol with multicast mode extension. 
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